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From the editor
Dear readers,
Best wishes, 
Marjan Nikolov, MSc
Editor
CEA expresses highest gratitude to OSCE for the support in publishing this newsletter.
info@cea.org.mk     www.cea.org.mk,  http://www.lsg-data.org.mk1
1) Thanks to the World Learning's (USAID) small grant, that CEA won in a competitive bid the web page: http://www.lsg-data.org.mk is available for all those in need of
data, information and indices related to the LSG. CEA is pioneer among the NGOs in hosting database with LSG data on the Internet and making it available to the larg-
er public with no fee.
The Center for Economic Analyses (CEA) is a think tank of economists who share a common vision for the
Republic of Macedonia as an emerging new European economy integrated in the regional and worldwide market. 
The Mission of CEA is to continuously research economic development and economic policy in the Republic of
Macedonia and to offer recommendations, suggestions and measures where it is deemed appropriate.
On one side the globalization, growing pressure of the urbanization, demographic changes and the transitional forces are
increasing the poverty in Macedonian municipalities and on the other side the empirical evidence in transitional countries shows
that the municipalities are increasing their capital expenditures reflecting the under investment during the transition period. The
situation is and will be further complicated with harmonization with EU regulations and standards. 
For the big urban centers in Macedonia the globalization will not be new phenomena but soon they will face the speed, scale
and complexity of global connections in the need of financing urban development. The need for capital finance will become more
and more an analyses of pros and cons of alternatives among grants from budget or donors, operating surplus inflow, sale of
assets and/or borrowing through loans or bond issuance. 
Supporting such a complex area of borrowing will require know-how and good practices in financial management, account-
ing, capital investment planning, debt management, forecasting, strategic planning, solutions for asymmetrical information prob-
lems and moral hazard, bankruptcy procedures etc. 
The purpose of the city financing strategies will become more important in determining how to ensure a sustainable fiscal
environment at the regional and local level without undesirable consequences at the macro level. 
Allowing municipalities to access capital markets is important complement to a well developed fiscal decentralization system
and devolution of fiscal power to municipalities and that is why we at CEA believe that it is not early do discuss the borrowing
pillar of fiscal decentralization as many believe. 
Interested and viable municipalities for borrowing and/or bond issuance will not be constraint with such believe. The capa-
ble managers of those municipalities will grab the opportunity and proceed with borrowing after 2007. 
In the long run, this completely new market in Macedonia will foster the development of local capital markets and possible
channel long-term financing from the international markets.
However, the municipalities should be prepared for a process of examination of all available information regarding their obli-
gation, rewards from potential investment and the risks those investments entails. 
Also, municipality's borrowing is dependant on some potential problems and issues like: poor accounting, disclosure, report-
ing standards, lack of regulatory laws, underdeveloped financial regulatory institutions, investor reliance on central government
bailouts, conflict of interests among creditors and borrowers all that contributing to potential macro fiscal instability as well. 
At the outset, I would like to thank the FSVC, USAID and the trainers for their dedication to transfer knowledge to the par-
ticipants of the training and finally, I express my deepest gratitude to the participants who have contributed to the event and have
improved the quality of public debate on issues of municipality borrowing in Macedonia.
The municipalities are confronted with inherited debts of around 50 Mio . This debt is considered as one of the most impor-
tant challenges for many municipalities all over the country. How can CEA in this situation edit a bulletin, which deals with
municipal loans?
Fiscal decentralization is the corner -stone of every decentralized system. This is the reason why the two year probation peri-
od affects mainly and firstly the fiscal autonomy of municipalities: during this period, the units of local self-government should
solidly prepare themselves for the next phase of fiscal decentralization, bringing increased competencies in the area of financial
management. As of 2007, numerous municipalities will face the opportunity, temptation and risk of turning to the financial mar-
kets and borrowing money on a long-term basis.
The purpose of this publication is to contribute in the efforts to prepare local self-government units for the moment when they
would be allowed to use this instrument i.e. to show how it can be used in a rational, responsible manner, as well as to demon-
strate its interrelatedness with issues like good governance, citizen's participation and financial soundness - via the municipal
credit-rating!

Dr. Philipp StielHead of Public
Administration Reform
Department
OSCE Spillover Monitor
Mission to Skopje
3The following goals were anticipated by CEA:
1. Where other see problem in LSG borrowing
issue, CEA see opportunity;
2. LSG in Macedonia handling borrowing challenge;
3. Improve transparency of LSG actions;
4. Enhance LSG administrative capacity in handling
transparent budget process;
5. Enhance LSG administrative capacity in develop-
ing firm financial management;
6. Increase the public awareness of the challenges
and current progress of the fiscal decentralization;
The advisors Mr. Charles Jokey from the IGE
Consulting LTD Hungary and Felix Ejgel Felixovich
Associate Director, International Public Finance from
Standard & Poor's Moscow delivered a five day work-
shop based on international best practices and illustrat-
ed with specific case studies. Each presentation includ-
ed group discussions. The workshop consisted of five
targeted modules that covered the following topics:
Module I: Establishing the Policy Environment to
Improve Local Government Finance
Module II: Strategic Options in Financing Capital
Expenditures in Local Governance
Module III: Building a Local Government Debt Mar-
ket: Institutional, Policy, and Legal Priorities
Module IV: Development of a Sub-national Bond
Market: Financing Priorities and Products
Module V: Developing a Credit and Borrowing Model
for Local Governments
Mastering the borrowing pillar of fiscal decentraliza-
tion will build further CEA's capacity, knowledge and
skills related to municipality financial management,
budgeting and how those processes are affecting the
creditworthiness of municipalities. This training was
first of that kind in Macedonia. Developing the capaci-
ty of local financial advisors and managers to under-
stand and apply options for financing local govern-
ments will be important for the ongoing success of de-
centralization process in Macedonia. Enabling local con-
sultants to rate the creditworthiness of sub-sovereign
borrowers will help improve the fiscal performance and
financial discipline of these borrowers as they begin to
explore the possibility of issuing debt. A more complete
picture of the financial performance of municipalities
will help attract potentially interested domestic and for-
eign investors. It will also facilitate the more efficient
allocation of financial resources to the most profitable
investments that support economic growth.
THE TRAINING IN LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT CREDIT RATING
The training was initiated by CEA and it took place 31st October - 4th November 2005. 
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Participants of the training and the trainers: 
Seating from left to right Marjan Nikolov-President of CEA, Felix Ejgel from S&P
Moscow, Charles Jokey IGE Hungary.
PARTICIPANTS
Name/surname of the participants Institution/Organization
Marjan Nikolov President of CEA
Marija Sekulovska CEA
Miso Nikolov CEA
Elena Pehcevska CEA
Aleksandar Nakovski Centre for Research and Policy Making 
Zoran Necev Centre for Research and Policy Making 
Goran Spasovski City of Skopje
Snezana Joseska City of Skopje
Katerina Stojanovik Aleksoska Economic Policy Research Institute  IZINEP
Aleksandar Spasevski Economic Think Tank
Gjorgji Josifov Make Decentralization Work / USAID
Jane Vrteski Make Decentralization Work / USAID
Andrija Aleksoski Ministry of Finance, International Finance Dep.
Ana Stojkova Ministry of Finance, Public Debt Dep.
Maja Subotic OSCE
Zage Filipovski OSCE
Violeta Madzova EAR Technical Assistance to MoF  
Bekim Imeri World Bank
Saso Trajkov Municipality of Gazi Baba
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The purpose of developing a City Financing Strategy is
to assist World Bank's clients in identifying their financing
needs and assisting them in raising capital to meet these
requirements. Accordingly, the CFS has three primary
activities: financial planning, debt management (includ-
ing credit rating strategy), and investment management.
1. Financial Planning includes a diagnosis of munic-
ipal structure needs (capital budgeting to determine the
adequate debt structure); identification of alternative
financing sources (including debt, grants, governmental
transfers, and current account surpluses).
2. Debt Management includes preparation of the
debt management framework oriented to risk manage-
ment, to measure the costs and risks, and to determine
the proper ALM structure. It also includes preparation of
funding and debt management policies and plans, plus
other activities associated with the debt issuing process
(such as credit rating strategy). After the first stage, the
municipality may decide to issue debt. In this case, the
CFS will assist the municipality in issuing bonds and
developing specific debt management techniques, such
as assessment of debt capacity and alternative debt
structures.
3. Investment Management includes how to devel-
op investment management policies and methods. The
first step is to identify how the city currently manages its
surplus funds. If the municipality considers issuing a
bond, the CFS will assist the city in the preparation of a
cash management program for the bond proceeds, and
integrate this program into the treasury's overall invest-
ment management function.
DEVELOPING A CITY FINANCING STRATEGY - WORLD BANK
THE LAW ON FINANCING LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT
The Law on LSG states that LSG have the right to bor-
row in the domestic and the foreign capital markets. In
addition, the new Law on Financing LSG distinguishes
borrowing, short-term borrowing, long-term borrowing
and government guaranties. 
In practice, LSG in Macedonia can borrow in the inter-
national capital market with prior consent from the
Government of Macedonia determined on the basis of the
opinion issued by the Ministry of Finance. Short-term bor-
rowing is allowed for cash flow management and must be
repaid by the end of the fiscal year. The ceiling on this
GENERAL POLICY DECISION FOR FINANCING OF
PROJECTS BY COMMERCIAL BANKS LOANS
IDENTIFICATION OF THE COMMERCIAL LOAN AS
ELIGIBLE FINANCING SOURCE 
(MAYOR / MUNICIPAL COUNCIL)
IDENTIFICATION OF THE
POTENTIALLY BANKABLE
PROJECTS
SELF ASSESSMENT OF
MUNICIPAL FINANCIAL
CAPACITY
CIP CAPITAL
INVESTMENT
PLAN
OTHER 
MEANS
LEGAL
COMPLIANCE
FINANCIAL
PROJECTIONS
COLLATERALS
AND
SECURITIES
PROJECT
PREPARATION
PROJECT
PREPARATION
DETAILED DESIGN
APPROVALS
NEGOTIATIONS 
WITH COMMERCIAL
BANKS
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL
APPROVAL
LOAN ARRANGEMENT
SIGNED
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
PROJECT MEET
CRITERIA
COMPLY WITH
FINANCIAL
CAPACITY
MUNICIPAL BORROWER PROCESS FLOW CHART
type of borrowing is 20 percent of the total revenues from
the so-called current-operational budget in the previous
fiscal year for the accumulated annual debt service.2
Starting 2007 long-term borrowing will be allowed for
capital investments and fixed assets financing only. The
ceiling on this type of borrowing is 15 percent of the total
revenues from the so-called current-operational budget in
the previous fiscal year for the accumulated annual debt
service. In the transitional provisions it is stipulated that
a LSG can start its long term borrowing if in a period of
24 months there is favorably reviewed financial reporting
from the LSG and if within two years from the law being
on power the local self government do not have arrears. 
The total amount of long term debt due including the
guaranties cannot exceed the total revenues from the so-
called current-operational budget in the previous fiscal
year.
Within 10 days after the contract for long term borrow-
ing is signed the local self government must submit the
contract and the amortization plan to the Ministry of
finance and more, for each installment serviced, the
Ministry of finance must be informed.
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2) The current operational budget is defined as the total revenues excluding grants from the budget of Macedonia and budgets of funds earmarked for financing capital investments, rev-
enue from self-contributions, and funds received in the form of loans. This will leave the own revenues from taxes on property, fees, and charges and retained part of the PIT as the basis
for calculating the ceiling for short-term borrowing. This arrangement may give additional incentives to LSG for increasing the collection rate of those revenues.
LSG DEBT IN MACEDONIA
As of May 2004, the total outstanding debt of munici-
palities is estimated at around EUR 43 million or 1.4 % of
the Macedonian GDP (the 15 EU member countries' aver-
age is 5.6 % of GDP). 
The structure of local debt is as illustrated in the next
tables. It should be noted that these figures are arrears
and not traditional debt in their nature. However, the law
on financing LSG says in article 18 that all arrears due
more than 90 days will be counted as
debt.
EXCERPTS FROM THE TRAINING PROGRAM (COURTESY FROM MR. JOKEY)
Design issues relating to the legal framework for 
municipal insolvency
! Early Warning System
! Maintain Municipal Services
! Create procedures for financial discipline without extra
burden on central government
! Reduce potential financial obligations of central govt.
! Maintain municipal autonomy
! Debt adjustment that is fair to creditors and preserves
market conditions
! Support cooperation among municipalities, Ministries, ot-
her stakeholders
Debt control mechanisms used elsewhere in Europe
! Restrictions on volume of borrowing and debt service ra-
tios
! UK: credit approval  
! Denmark:  no municipal borrowing is allowed at all with a
few exceptions.  
! Germany:  each Bundesland has its own volume of bor-
rowing limits and explicit approval is needed from the Land 
! Poland and Czech Republic:  15% of revenues may be
used to fund debt service
! Croatia:  20% of own resources may be used for debt
service and the MOF needs to approve each loan
! Ireland:  each municipal borrowing must be approved by
the Minister who determines whether they need the loan
and whether they can pay it back
! Austria:  each Land has a different set of criteria for debt
needing higher level approval, and differing absolute or
relative limits
! Restrictions on municipal guarantees
! Guarantees to third parties are allowed and NOT counted
against debt limits:  UK, Sweden, Czech Republic, Finland.
! Municipal guarantees are restricted to public purpose
organizations, non-profit organizations, communal enter-
prises, or enterprises and institutions with municipal
Principal Interest Total
Total: 2,006,692,797 1,142,836,906 3,149,529,703
Financial structure
By type of debt Structure
Administrative 0.37%
Construction 62.36%
Electricity 8.50%
Expropriation of land 3.51%
Other 25.27%
Total: 3.149.529.703
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majority ownership:  Belgium, Norway, Denmark, Croatia.
! Guarantees to third parties are counted as municipal debt
and included in the limits on debt volumes:  Croatia,
Denmark, France, Austria.
! Restrictions on collateral
! No municipal asset may be used to guarantee debt, only
cash flow: UK
! Property may be used to guarantee municipal loans:
Ireland, Norway, Finland, Denmark. (by Bundesland per-
mission only in Germany) 
! Public sector assets may not be used as collateral:
Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal 
! No restrictions on the use of municipal assets as collater-
al:  Czech Republic, Poland, Croatia
Why are municipal defaults and excessive borrowing
risky?
LSG:
! Inability to make timely payment, penalties and sanctions
imposed
! Strain on operational budget
! Halted or partially finished investment projects don't pay
returns
! Assets and collateral lost
! Disruption of essential public services
! Risk of losing next election
! Sanctions from national government (eligibility for other
grants, criminal prosecution etc)
! Repayment of other debts endangered
! Blacklisting by financial institutions
! Ultimate dissolution of local government, forced merger
and state supervision 
Central governemnt:
! Guarantees called, stress on national budget
! International obligations on gross state debt (Maastricht,
IMF etc.)
! Bad precedents set in case of repeated bailouts
! Lose value of grants and investments already made if pro-
jects are halted midstream
! Service provision obligation may revert to national level
(safe drinking water)
! "bad publicity" for entire local government system
! need for policy reform and incipient debate
Creditor/bond holder:
! balance sheet losses (value of loans made or bonds held,
or accounts receivable written off)
! provisioning and regulatory problems
! cost of managing bad assets
! negative publicity for banks "pressuring" municipalities
! risk of losing entire asset/loan in a workout agreement or
liquidation procedure
! lost future business with municipal sector
The international experience offers several approaches
to the management of local government debt from which
Macedonia might profit when designing its own model.
The most common approaches include: (i) leaving finan-
cial market discipline to operate freely; (ii) establishing
strict administrative, case-by-case control; and (iii) es-
tablishing explicit, preemptive and legally binding gener-
al rules to prevent crises and encourage good market
behavior. A combination of these options may prove more
advantageous for the Macedonia.
In principle, market discipline would set the most desir-
able benchmarks. However, governments realize at times
that market discipline alone cannot be as effective as
desired, because of prevailing market failures, including
restricted access to financial markets, lack of transparen-
cy, soft budget constraints and moral hazard incentives or
insensitivity to market signals. The international evidence
is that even in mature financial markets sole reliance on
market discipline may not be satisfactory for controlling
excessive indebtedness of sub-national governments.  
Most countries have opted for the use rules to regulate
access to credit markets by sub-national governments.
Rules for access to capital markets can be effective only
if they are legally binding, simple to follow, transparent,
and applied across-the-board. Such rules should com-
prise clear quantitative limits and procedural norms,
which respect and imitate, to the extent possible, good
practices of financial market discipline and creditworthi-
ness indicators. 
SOME RULES FOR THE USE OF CREDIT BY MACEDONIA'S LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
E-Interview with Prof. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Georgia State University
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In Macedonia the needs for local infrastructure invest-
ment have been traditionally covered by the central gov-
ernment, mainly through the off-budget Road Fund (un-
der specific criteria), the BUR and the Ministry of trans-
portation, which approves funds for construction, mod-
ernization and reconstruction of local roads, the power
supply network, local water supply systems, sewage net-
work, and so on.
There is some international donor funding of local in-
vestments but the allocation of donor funding often re-
flects the initiative of individual municipalities, which re-
sults in some arbitrariness in the local incidence of these
projects. This system results in an allocation mismatch of
LSG priorities compared to priorities of the national gov-
ernment regional policy (if any). 
As long as local investments are funded by the nation-
al government or by international donors through capital
grants, the risk of macroeconomic instability is reduced.
However, uncontrolled access of municipalities to domes-
tic or international capital markets could jeopardize mac-
roeconomic and fiscal sustainability in principle. 
In the next figure one can see how the economic
growth affects the debt to GDP ratio and the fiscal sus-
tainability in Macedonia3. The following assumptions were
taken into account:
! Previous debt is on the level of the IMF's 40 % debt
rule;
! Primary deficit up to 2004;
! GG deficit from 2005 as agreed with the IMF;
! US $ LIBOR up to 2006;
! US $ interest rate of 3 % from 2006;
! Macedonian interest rate of 5 % for repayment of pre-
vious debt;
! Share of foreign currency denominated debt of 0.640;
! GDP deflator 3 %;
! GDP real growth rate of 4 % in 2005 and 4.5 % for
2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 as agreed with the IMF
! Nominal MKD exchange rate depreciation against US $
dynamics for: 2006=50 MKD, 2007=55 MKD, 2008=61
MKD. After 2009 1 US $ = 1 EUR.
I will use the accounting approach (used by IMF as
well) for fiscal sustainability estimation in which econom-
ic indicators as a percent of GDP are used to assess debt
sustainability. Under this approach, pre-defined macro-
economic targets are specified for the rate of inflation,
the real growth rate of output in the economy, and the
interest rate.
The stress test for public debt to GDP ratio is illustrat-
ed in the next Table for the baseline scenario of 4 % GDP
MECHANISMS OF PREVENTING MACROECONOMIC DESTABILIZATION
Marjan Nikolov, MSc
(i) Obey the "golden rule" - i.e., never borrow to finan-
ce recurrent expenditures and restrict loans to high-
return investment expenditures in infrastructure and
social services. 
(ii) Limit the debt service ratio of local governments to
a fixed conservative maximum of sub-national govern-
ment revenues.
(iii) Limit the total indebtedness indicator of local gov-
ernment (i.e., the ratio of debt stock outstanding-inclu-
ding indirect and contingent liabilities-to the flow of to-
tal annual revenue excluding conditional grants) to a
maximum.
(iv) Limit financial institutions' portfolio exposure to lo-
cal credit to a certain maximum dictated by recommen-
ded banking prudential rules, enforced on a bank-by-
bank assets basis, for each local government. 
(v) Adopt and implement a financial emergency or ban-
kruptcy law for local governments that could clearly
define debt workout procedures in case of local govern-
ment default. 
(vi) Adopt a Law on Fiscal Responsibility aiming at limi-
ting reiterated, excessive deficits and the imprudent
buildup of (local) public debt.  
(vii) Encourage the dissemination of risk and credit rat-
ing analyses of local governments to improve trans-
parency, and impel the financial system to operate as
closely as possible to market discipline, and promote
the practice of creditworthiness analysis.
(viii) Establish an official monitoring agency, possibly
under the Ministry of Finance, to keep records and mon-
itor the overall development of local government indebt-
edness, including all kinds of contingent liabilities.
Rules for access to capital markets:
3) This simulation was done by Marjan Nikolov for the purpose of the final paper request upon the "Public Debt Management Training"  October 14-November 26, 2005 Skopje,
Macedonia conducted by University of Pittsburgh, Graduate Center for Public Policy and Management-Skopje.
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growth rate after 2010. Unfortunately the subsovereign
debt was not counted for. 
The results from the sensitivity analyses for different
growth rates of GDP are illustrated in the next figure.
What we can conclude from the graph is that all else
equal the economic growth has impact on how much a
government can borrow. For Macedonia after 2009 (if all
macro indicators are on line with what is agreed with IMF)
growth rates lower than 2 % will lead to unsustainable
debt to GDP ratio. That is why the central government
should create the ambient for higher economic growth
rates than the experienced so far in these 15 years of
transition. 
This model can also give answer to the question of how
much additional borrowing can be allowed for given GDP
growth up to the moment when the targeted debt is on
the 40 % debt to GDP line.
The new public debt law should be amended to include
provisions for debt management on subsovereign level as
well. Refereeing only to the law on financing local self
government is not enough. A possible impact assessment
of amending a new municipality bankruptcy law could
prove very beneficial for prevention and regulation in this
area as well. 
The Public Debt Department within the ministry of
finance can also make some simulations as of how much
additional borrowing can be allowed for given GDP growth
up to the moment when the targeted debt is on the IMF's
rule of 40 % debt to GDP for different sovereign and sub-
sovereign borrowing portfolios. They should also start to
develop a system for registering subsovereign debt and
data collection and analyses. 
Capital markets in Macedonia are still narrow, which
limits access of municipal governments to capital market.
This makes local borrowing difficult in an environment of
no stable and predictable revenue stream. Prevailing high
interest rates will limit any borrowing-capital investment
plans for the municipalities in the near future.
Besides the legal limits on borrowing and central gov-
ernment discretionary control, under the new law there
are certain instruments that should assure the municipal-
ities to be credible and disciplined if they want to borrow.
Finally, the government issues guaranties for local bor-
rowing only if the liability is undertaken in accordance
with the law. All these measures together should keep
LSG in check in the future.
Stress test for public debt ratio
Time, t Change in Auto debt Primary Public debt
public sector debt dynamics deficit ratio
2003 -0.046 -0.047 0.000 0.458
2004 -0.040 -0.031 0.009 0.418
2005 0.001 -0.003 -0.004 0.419
2006 0.007 0.001 -0.006 0.425
2007 0.016 0.010 -0.006 0.442
2008 0.018 0.012 -0.006 0.460
2009 -0.009 -0.015 -0.006 0.451
2010 -0.007 -0.013 -0.006 0.445
2011 -0.007 -0.013 -0.006 0.438
2012 -0.007 -0.013 -0.006 0.431
2013 -0.007 -0.013 -0.006 0.425
2014 -0.007 -0.013 -0.006 0.418
2015 -0.007 -0.013 -0.006 0.411
 
0.340
0.360
0.380
0.400
0.420
0.440
0.460
0.480
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
2 % GDP growth 3 % GDP growth 4 % GDP growth 5 % GDP growth 6 % GDP growth 7 % GDP growth
IMF 40 % Debt Rule
! rating request in advance before
the management meeting:
! five years of annual finacnial
statements
! interim financial statements
! narrative descriptions of operations  
and products
! other documents that analysts deem
pertinent toa particular rating
determination
! the press release
! reports and ongoing surveilance
! credit watch
! the management meeting
discussion:
! econmic envuironemtn and 
prospects
! overview of major business
segments
! management's financial policies and
performance goals
! accounting practices
! management's projections, inco, me 
and cash flows statements and
balance sheets
! capital spending plans
! financial alternatives and
contingency plans
! S&P review and analysis
! the rating comittee meeting
! the apeal period
S&P RATING PROCESS FOR MUNICIPALTIES CREDIT RATING:
